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OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Suzanne Phillips appeals the District Court’s denial of compensatory damages on 
her contract claim following a jury’s finding that the United States Postal Service 
(“Postal Service”) breached a settlement agreement with Phillips.  Phillips also appeals 
the District Court’s denial of spoliation sanctions against the Postal Service in light of its 
failure to implement a litigation hold on the destruction of documents.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of compensatory damages on Phillips’ 
contract claim and dismiss her appeal with regard to spoliation sanctions.  
I.   
 
We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  Suzanne Phillips is a mail processing clerk who began her career at the 
Postal Services in 1989.  In 1998, Phillips sued the Postmaster General for sexual 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII stemming from the conduct of Postal 
Service manager, Thomas Arneson.  In 1999, Phillips and the Postal Service settled the 
dispute.  As part of the settlement agreement, Phillips was protected from any further 
retaliation relating to her suit:  “Defendant, the Postmaster General, agree[s] that neither 
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he nor his employees will use against Plaintiff Phillips, any of her actions taken to protect 
her rights under federal law, in terms of promotion, transfer, the grant of benefits or 
salary raises, or any other term or condition of her employment with the defendant.”  
Joint Appendix (“JA”) 471.   
Phillips alleges that beginning in 2006, she was retaliated against by Arneson 
through his intimidating behavior, threats of discipline, denial of vacation leave, and 
assignment of more physically demanding and less desirous work tasks.  Following a 
final agency decision on her complaint in March 2007, Phillips filed suit against the 
Postal Service in June 2007 under the retaliation provisions of Title VII and based on the 
Postal Service’s breach of contract of the non-retaliation provision in the settlement 
agreement. 
In February 2008, Phillips requested during discovery a broad range of documents 
including all documents and electronically stored information with Phillips’ name.  In 
October 2008, Phillips filed a motion for sanctions claiming that the Postal Service 
committed spoliation of discovery materials by (1) shredding documents and (2) deleting 
stored emails.  Despite the Postal Service’s admission that it failed to impose a timely 
litigation hold for the retention of documents, the District Court denied the motion for 
spoliation sanctions, finding that Phillips’ allegations that relevant documents were 
destroyed was pure speculation and that there was no evidence that the Postal Service 
acted with bad or malicious intentions by destroying documents.   
The case was tried before a jury beginning on March 2, 2010.  The District Court 
proposed its own jury instructions to the parties on March 4.  At a hearing, the Court 
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raised concerns as to whether the jury could award damages based on the contract claim 
and whether the verdict form to be submitted to the jury needed to differentiate the 
damages between Phillips’ claims.  Phillips’ counsel maintained:  “[T]here aren’t any 
monetary damages under the contract, itself.  I think if there is a finding of liability, 
which is coextensive, to the extent we were looking for anything under the contract, we 
would come back to the Court for injunctive relief or otherwise to make her whole.”  JA 
590.  Phillips’ counsel argued that a finding of liability on the breach of contract claim 
was sufficient to allow Phillips to seek injunctive relief with the Court, and that damages 
stemming from the contract claim did not need to be presented to the jury.  JA 594-95.  
Phillips’ counsel reiterated that there were two separate claims, for breach of contract and 
retaliation, but that no instructions were necessary for damages stemming from the 
breach of contract claim.  JA 592, 594, 595.   
The District Court provided the jury with the following instruction on liability and 
damages:  “Here, because plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is based on a non-retaliation 
provision in the settlement agreement, the damages for plaintiff’s breach of contract and 
retaliation claims are coextensive.”  JA 605.  Additionally, the District Court removed 
any breach of settlement agreement language from the damage section of the verdict 
form.  During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the District Court regarding 
whether it was allowed to provide damages to Phillips based only on her breach of 
contract claim.  The District Court recognized that its jury instructions noted that the Title 
VII and breach of contract damages were coextensive, but that the verdict form was 
unclear whether the jury could provide for a damage amount if it found that the Postal 
5 
 
Service only breached the agreement.  During discussions with the parties on how to fix 
this problem, Phillips’ counsel maintained that the contract and retaliation claims were 
coextensive and not actually two separate claims, and then requested an instruction for 
emotional damages for breach of contract, although this had never been raised prior to 
this time.  JA 633-38.   
 The District Court determined that it was too late for Phillips to change the theory 
of the case:  
But, you can’t now change in midstream.  You got up and you said, clearly 
and unequivocally, that you were looking for specific performance.  You 
can’t now, after you have tried the entire case with that theory, switch gears 
and ask for emotional damages for a breach of contract which were never 
requested and never part of this case.  
 
JA 634.  The District Court determined that the contract and Title VII claims were not 
coextensive and that the jury could have reasons to find that the Postal Service breached 
the contract provisions without finding a Title VII violation.  The District Court, 
therefore, amended the jury instructions by removing the language that the liability for 
both claims was coextensive.  Additionally, the District Court revised the verdict form, 
removing the issue of damages for breach of contract from the jury’s consideration.   
 On March 9, 2010, the jury found that the Postal Service had breached its 
settlement agreement with Phillips, but that it had not retaliated against Phillips under 
Title VII.  On March 22, 2010, the District Court entered final judgment against Phillips 
on her Title VII claim and granted specific performance on her breach of contract claim.  
On May 10, 2010, Phillips filed a motion for entry of judgment for contract damages and 
a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and a motion to alter judgment.  On 
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June 30, 2010, the District Court denied the motion, finding that Phillips had never 
sought damages for breach of contract and was therefore barred from such an award.  
Phillips filed a timely appeal.1
 Second, Phillips maintains that the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
her spoliation sanctions.  We, however, cannot reach the merits of this issue as we do not 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to review the District Court’s denial of Phillips’ 
spoliation motion.  According to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), a party is required to specify 
the “judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”  We have recognized that notices 
 
II. 
  Phillips raises two issues on appeal.  First, she contends that the District Court 
erred by denying her compensatory damages on her contract claim because she was 
entitled to such damages as a matter of law and never waived her right to compensatory 
damages.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Phillips waived her 
right to compensatory damages on her contract claim repeatedly throughout the course of 
the trial.  JA 588-95, 604, 617, 633-35.  Phillips made clear to the District Court all the 
way through the second day of jury deliberations that she was only seeking specific 
performance on her contract claim and she litigated her theory fully on the merits.  See 
Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 429 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that it is incumbent on the 
plaintiff to bring its request for damages to the trial judge prior to the time the jury retires 
to consider the verdict). 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
16(c), and 39 U.S.C. § 409(a), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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of appeal are generally liberally construed as it is “almost axiomatic that decisions on the 
merits are not to be avoided on grounds of technical violations of procedural rules.”  
Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998).  Hence, 
appellate jurisdiction is permissible over orders that are not specified in the notice of 
appeal where: “(1) there is a connection between the specified and unspecified orders; (2) 
the intention to appeal the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not 
prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144; see, 
e.g., Satterfield v. Johnson, 434 F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 2006) (exercising jurisdiction over 
the appeal because the district court’s order adopting a magistrate judge’s 
recommendation regarding statutory tolling was related to the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because such a claim could not be reached without disposing of the 
issue of timeliness); Polonski, 137 F.3d at 144 (finding that an appeal from an order 
adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation to reduce attorney’s fees was sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction over an appeal of the earlier order granting attorney’s fees); 
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1990) (exercising 
jurisdiction because notice of appeal designating portions of summary judgment order on 
a discrimination claim were “inextricably meshed” with prior order dismissing a 
retaliation claim). 
 Phillips’ notice of appeal only referenced the District Court’s June 30 order 
addressing the damages relating to the contract claim.  Even applying Rule 3 liberally, 
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Phillips has failed to satisfy the test for appellate jurisdiction.2
                                              
2 Phillips argues that her brief served as the “functional equivalent” of notice to warrant 
appellate jurisdiction in accordance with Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992).  The 
Supreme Court in Smith recognized that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do 
“not preclude an appellate court from treating a filing styled as a brief as a notice of 
appeal [], if the filing is timely under Fed. R. App. P. 4, and conveys the information 
required by Fed. R. App. P. 3(c).”  Id. at 249.  Accordingly, key to allowing a brief to 
serve as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal is that the non-appealing party is 
given notice within the time period for filing the notice of appeal.  Id. at 248.  Phillips, 
however, did not file her appellate brief within the time period for filing her notice of 
appeal.  Therefore, Phillips’ argument that her brief can serve as the functional equivalent 
of a notice of appeal is rejected. 
  Phillips has not provided 
any connection between the June 30 order and the earlier spoliation order.  In fact, 
Phillips never even challenged the jury’s findings of liability on the Title VII or contract 
claim post-verdict or on appeal, thus possibly implicating evidentiary issues and her 
motion for spoliation.  Additionally, there is no indication in the notice of appeal that 
Phillips intended to appeal the spoliation motion or any evidentiary-related issue.   
Therefore, even considering the liberal application of Rule 3, we conclude that there is no 
appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of Phillips’ spoliation motion 
as Phillips did not provide a proper notice of appeal on this issue.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm District Court’s denial of Phillips’ 
request for compensatory damages on her contract claim and dismiss her appeal with 
regard to spoliation sanctions.   
